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These results tell me that bargaining behavior is predictable. According to Andersen, et al. (2011), one can predict how people will respond to incentives because in making decisions, people are usually motivated by their self-interest, thus their acceptance or rejection of offers depend on their perception of gain (Andersen et al., 2011). Additionally, the results imply a degree of utility-maximization and rationality in bargaining, but also suggest that individual decisions are also influenced by other factors other than self-interest. Looking at the table containing the average amounts that the proposer would keep, it appears that the lower the stake, the more the proposer is willing to offer to the responder and the higher the stake the more the responder would keep for themselves...

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