1. Player 1 chooses an action in {T,B} player 2 chooses an action i...

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1. Player 1 chooses an action in {T,B} player 2 chooses an action in (L,R}, and their payoffs (u1, u2) depend on their actions as follows: Player 1 \ Player 2 L R T 0, 9 6, 3 B 3, 4 2, 5 (a) Suppose that player 1 chooses his action first. If player 1 chooses T, then there would be probability 1/3 of player 2 seeing l's choice of T before 2 chooses her own action. If player 1 chooses B, then player 2 would see nothing, but 2 would also see nothing with probability 2/3 if 1 chose T. Show an extensive form game tree that describes this game. (b) Find a sequential equilibrium of the extensive form game in part (a). Compute each player's expected payoff in this equilibrium (as expected at the beginning of the game).

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