There are two players, called Row and Column, who play a game that can last two periods. In the
first period they simultaneously choose actions F or C. If they both choose F then the game
continues and they move to the second period. If at least one player chooses C the game ends and
they get the payoffs in the table below
After playing (F,F) in the first period, the players again simultaneously choose F or C in the
second period and get the payoffs below. (The game cannot continue beyond the second
Find all the subgame perfect equilibria.
Describe the players' strategies at Nash equilibrium of this game that is not a subgame perfect
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