GAME THEORY AND STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING
Section A
A1: Consider the following game matrix:

                                                      Player B
                                                      Left          Right
Player A                Top             17, 17       18, 16
                           Bottom          16, 18          x, x

(a) For what values of x will this game have a (strictly) dominant strategy Nash equilibrium?
(b) For what values of x will the dominant strategy Nash equilibrium be Pareto efficient?
(c) For which values of x will (Bottom, Right) be a Nash equilibrium of this game?
(d) Are there any values of x such that (Bottom, Right) is the only Nash equilibrium of the game?
Explain your reasoning.

A2: Two hunters are on an expedition. Each can either try to pursue a stag, or catch a hare. If both hunters pursue the stag, they catch it and share it equally. If a hunter attempts to catch a hare, then she will catch it, and it will belong to her alone, but the stag will escape. Each hunter prefers a share of a stag to a whole hare.
(a) Draw the normal form of the game that represents the situation just described.
(b) Find the Nash equilibrium/Nash equilibria of the game. Is it/are they Pareto efficient?
Explain your reasoning.

GAME THEORY AND STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING Section A A1: Consider...