Answer all THREE of the following questions in one or two paragraphs each. Your answers to individual questions should be no more than one double-spaced page in length, using a standard 12 pt. font and 2.54 cm (= 1 inch) margins. Part of the assignment is to answer the question in the space allocated, so do not exceed the length restriction.
1. Frege maintains that thoughts, and the sense-meanings from which thoughts are composed, cannot be identified with psychological states. Briefly explain one way that Frege argues for this position. Then, considering the desiderata for theories of concepts from Module 6, explain which desideratum for a theory of concepts Frege's view most closely aligns with.
2. In your own words, recount Chomsky's criticisms of B.F. Skinner's behaviourist account of language acquisition based on operant conditioning.
3. Classical definitional accounts of concepts view concepts as having an internal structure. How do we analyze the meaning of complex concepts in light of their internal structure? IIlustrate by providing an example of an analyzed concept.
Write a brief paper on ONE (and only one) of the following questions. Your paper should be no more than two double-spaced pages in length, using a standard 12 pt. font and 2.54 cm (= 1inch) margins. Part of the assignment involves efficiently communicating your ideas in the allotted space, so do not exceed the length restriction.
1. What is Descartes wax argument? Why does Descartes think we need the intellect, over and above the faculties of sensation and imagination, in order to identify the wax as the same wax (i.e. to perceive it as a unified object persisting through time)? Do you agree with Descartes's position, or do you think he underestimates the roles of sensation and imagination in providing knowledge of external objects? Argue for your position.
This material may consist of step-by-step explanations on how to solve a problem or examples of proper writing, including the use of citations, references, bibliographies, and formatting. This material is made available for the sole purpose of studying and learning - misuse is strictly forbidden.1. One way Frege argues for the position that thoughts and their component sense-meanings cannot be identified with psychological states is by pointing out what such identification would entail: Identification of thoughts with psychological states entails the identification of any particular thought with some singular psychological state, in some one consciousness, of some one person. Frege’s point is that thoughts would thus be rendered things that are entirely private. The consequences of such radical sense-meaning privacy would be immense (and nonsensical). For example, if science is constituted by thoughts, and if thoughts are identified with psychological states, then there would be such things as my science and your science and Elizabeth’s science, and so on. And, because such sciences would be constituted by and contained within the totality of thoughts within each consciousness, the very notion of science will have lost its meaning; there could be no well-founded disagreement; there could be no falsification; and, thus, there would be no point to inquiry or dispute about what is true. The identification of thoughts with psychological states would render truth itself to be private and disparate and only ever concerned with the thoughts of a given consciousness.
Thus, clearly, it is the publicity desideratum for a theory of concepts that Frege’s view most closely satisfies. To extend Frege’s science-centered argument, for there to be linguistic communication or...
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